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DISCUSSION.
THE PHYSICAL BASIS OF EMOTION.
In the year 1884 Prof. Lange of Copenhagen and the present writer
published, independently of each other, the same theory of emotional
consciousness. They affirmed it to be the effect of the organic
changes, muscular and visceral, of which the so-called 'expression'
of the emotion consists. It is thus not a primary feeling, directly
aroused by the exciting object or thought, but a secondary feeling
indirectly aroused; the primary effect being the organic changes in
question, which are immediate reflexes following upon the presence of
the object.
This idea has a paradoxical sound when first apprehended, and it
has not awakened on the whole the confidence of psychologists. It
may interest some readers if I give a sketch of a few of the more
recent comments on it.
Professor Wundt's criticism may be mentioned first* He unquali-
fiedly condemns it, addressing himself exclusively to Lange's version.
He accuses the latter of being one of those psychologischen Scfuimr-
kldrungen which assume that science is satisfied when a psychic fact
is once for all referred to a physiological ground.
His own account of the matter is that the immediate and primary
result of ' the reaction of Apperception f on any conscious-content'
or object is a Geftihl (364). Gefiikl is an unanalyzable and simple
process corresponding in the sphere of Gemiith to sensation in the
• Philosophiscbe Studien, vi. 349, (1801).
f la this article, as in the 4th edition of his Psychology, Wundt vaguely com-
pletes his volte-face concerning ' Apperception ' and dimly describes the latter in
assoctationist terms. " Apperception is nothing really separable from the effects
which it produces in the content of representation. In fact it consists of nothing
but these concomitants and effects. [A thing that 'consists' of its concomi-
tants !] . . . In each single apperceptive act the entire previous content of the
conscious life operates as a sort of integral total force " (364, 365), etc. The whole
account seems indistinguishable from pure Herbartism, in which Apperception is
only a name for the interaction of the old and the new in consciousness, of which
interaction feeling may be one result.
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sphere of intellection (359). But Gefuhle have the power of altering
the course of ideas—inhibiting some and attracting others, according
to their nature; and these ideas in turn produce both secondary
Gefuhle and organic changes. The organic changes in turn set up
additional sinnliche Gefuhle which fuse with the preceding ones and
strengthen the volume of feeling aroused. This whole complex pro-
cess is what Wundt calls an Affect or Emotion—a state of mind which,
as he rightly says, 'has thus the power of intensifying itself (358—
363). I shall speak later of what may be meant by the primary
Gefuhl thus described. Wundt in any case would seem to be certain
both that it is the essential part of the emotion, and that currents from
the periphery cannot be its organic correlate. I should say, granting
its existence, that it falls short of the emotion proper, since it involves
no commotion, and that such currents are its cause. But of these
points later on. The rest of Wundt's criticism is immaterial, dealing
exclusively with certain rash methodological remarks of Lange's; em-
phasizing the 'parallelism' of the psychical and the physical; and
pointing out the vanity of seeking in the latter a causal explanation of
the former. As if Lange ever pretended to do this in any intimate
sense ! Two of Wundt's remarks, however, are more concrete.
How insufficient, he says, must Lange's explanation of emotions
from vaso-motor effects be, when it results in making him put joy and
anger together in one class ! To which I reply both that Lange has
laid far too great stress on the vaso-motor factor in his explanations,
and that he has been materially wrong about congestion of the face
being the essential feature in anger, for in the height of that passion
almost every one grows pale—a fact which the expression ' white with
rage' commemorates. Secondly, Wundt says, whence comes it that if
a certain stimulus be what causes emotional expression by its mere
reflex effects, another stimulus almost identical with the first will fail
to do so if its menial effects are not the same ? (355). The mental
motivation is the essential thing in the production of the emotion, let
the ' object' be what it may.
This objection, in one form or another, recurs in all the published
criticisms. "Not the mere object as such is what determines the
physical effects," writes Mr. D. Irons in a recent article* which, if it
were more popularly written, would be undeniably effective, " but the
subjective feeling towards the object . . . An emotional class is not
something objective; each subject to a great extent classifies in this
regard for itself, and even here time and circumstance make alteration
* Professor James'* Theory of Emotion, Mind, p. 78, 1894.
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and render stability impossible. . . . If I were not afraid, the object
would not be an object of terror " (p. 84). And Dr. W. L. Worcester, in
an article * which is both popularly written. and effective, says:
" Neither running nor any other of the symptoms of fear which he
[W. J.] enumerates is the necessary result of seeing a bear. A
chained or caged bear may excite only feelings of curiosity, and a well-
armed hunter might experience only pleasurable feelings at meeting
one loose in the woods. It is not, then, the perception of the bear
that excites the movements of fear. We do not run from the bear
unless we suppose him capable of doing us bodily injury. Why should
the expectation of being eaten, for instance, set the muscles of our
legs in motion ? ' Common-sense' would be likely to say that it was
because we object to being eaten; but according to Professor James
the reason we dislike to be eaten is because we run away " (287).
A reply to these objections is the easiest thing in the world to make
if one only remembers the force of association in psychology. ' Objects'
are certainly the primitive arousers of instinctive reflex movements. But
they take their place, as experience goes on, as elements m total
' situations,' f the other suggestions of which may prompt to move-
ments of an entirely different sort. As soon as an object has become
thus familiar and suggestive, its emotional consequences, on any theory
of emotion, must start rather from the total situation which it suggests
than from its own naked presence. But whatever be our reaction on
the situation, in the last resort h is an instinctive reaction on that one
of its elements which strikes us for the time being as most vitally im-
portant. The same bear may truly enough excite us to either fight
or flight, according as he suggests an overpowering ' idea' of his killing
us, or one of our killing him. But in either case the question remains:
Does the emotional excitement which follows the idea follow it imme-
diately, or secondarily and as a consequence of the 'diffusive wave' of
impulses aroused ?
Dr. Worcester finds something absurd in the very notion of acts
constituting emotion by the consciousness which they arouse. How is
k, he says, with voluntary acts ? " If I see a shower coming up and
run for a shelter, the emotion is evidently of the same kind, though per-
haps less in degree, as in the case of the man who runs from the bear.
According to Professor James, I am tifraid of getting wet because I
run. But suppose that instead of running I step into a shop and buy
* Observations on some points in James's Psychology. II. Emotion.—The
Monlst, voL in. p. 385 (1893).
f In my nomenclature it Is the total situation which Is the ' object' on which the
reaction of the subject is made.
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an umbrella. The emotion is still the same. I am afraid of getting
wet. Consequently, so far as I can see, the fear in this case consists
in buying the umbrella. Fear of hunger, in like manner, might consist
in laying in a store of provisions ; fears of poverty in shovelling dirt at
a dollar a day, and so on indefinitely. Anger, again, may be associated
with many other actions than striking. Shylock's anger at Antonio's
insults induced him to lend him money. Did the anger . . . consist
in the act of lending the money?" (291). I think that all the force
of such objections lies in the slapdash brevity of the language used, of
which I admit that my own text set a bad example when it said ' we
are frightened because we run.' Yet let the word 'run' but stand for
what it was meant to stand for, namely, for many other movements in
us, of which invisible visceral ones seem by far the most essential; dis-
criminate also between the various grades of emotion which we desig-
nate by one name, and our theory holds up its head again. ' Fear' of
getting wet is not the same fear as fear of a bear. It may limit itself
to a prevision of the unpleasantness of a wet skin or of spoiled clothes,
and this may prompt either to deliberate running or to buying an
umbrella with a very minimum of properly emotional excitement being
aroused. Whatever the fear may be in such a case it is not consti-
tuted by the voluntary act.* Only the details of the concrete case can'
inform us whether it be, as above suggested, a mere ideal vision of
unpleasant sensations, or whether it go farther and involve also feelings
of reflex organic change. But in either case our theory will cover all
the facts.
Both Dr. Worcester and Mr. Irons are struck by this variability in
the symptoms of any given emotion ; and holding the emotion itself to
be constant, they consider that such inconstant symptoms cannot be
its cause. Dr. Worcester acutely remarks that the actions accompany-"
ing all emotions tend to become alike in proportion to their intensity.
People weep from excess of joy; pallor and trembling accompany
extremes of hope as well as of fear, etc. But, I answer, do not the
subject's feelings also then tend to become alike, if considered in
themselves apart from all their differing intellectual contexts ? My
theory maintains that they should do so; and such reminiscences of
extreme emotion as I possess rather seem to confirm than to invalidate
such a view.
In Dr. Lehmann's highly praiseworthy book,' Die Hauptgesetze des
menschlichen Gef iihlslebens,' \ much is said of Lange's theory; and in
* When the-running has actually commenced, it gives rise to exhilaration by its
effects on breathing and pulse, etc, In this case, and not to fear.
{Leipzig,
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particular this same alleged identity of the emotion in the midst of
such shifting organic symptoms seems to strike the critic as a fact irre-
concilable with its being true. The emotion ought to be different
when the symptoms are different, if the latter make the emotion;
whereas if we lay a primary mental feeling at its core its constancy
with shifting symptoms is no such hard thing to understand (p. 120).
Some inconstancy in the mental state itself, however, Dr. Lehmann
admits to follow from the shifting symptoms; but he contrasts the
small degree of this inconstancy in the case of ' motived' emotions
where we have a recognized mental cause for our mood, with its great
degree where the emotion is ' unmotived,' as when it is produced by
intoxicants (alcohol, haschisch, opium) or by cerebral disease, and
changes to its opposite with every reversal of the vaso-motor and other
organic states. I must say that I cannot regard this argument as fatal
to Lange's and my theory so long as we remain in such real ignorance
as to what the subjective variations of our emotions actually are.
Exacter observation, both introspective and symptomatic, might well
show in ' motived' emotions also just the amount of inconstancy that
the theory demands.
Mr. Irons actually accuses me of self-contradiction in admitting
that the symptoms of the same emotion vary from one man to another,
and yet that the emotion has them for its cause. How can any defi-
nite emotion, he asks, exist under such circumstances, and -what is
there then left to give unity to such concepts as anger or fear at all
(82) ? The natural reply is that the bodily variations are within limits,
and that the symptoms of the angers and of the fe te of different men
still preserve enough functional resemblance, to say the very least, in
the midst of their diversity to lead-us to call them by identical names.
Surely there is no definite affection of ' anger' in an ' entitative' sense.
Mr. Irons finds great difficulty in believing that both intellectual
and emotional states of mind, both the cognition of an object and the
emotion which it causes, contrasted as they are, can be due to such
similar neural processes, viz., currents from the periphery, as my theory
assumes. " How," he asks, " can one perceptive process of itself suffuse
with emotional warmth the cold intellectuality of another? . . . If
perceptions can have this warmth, why is it the exclusive property of
perception of organic disturbance (85.) ? " I reply in the first place
that it is not such exclusive property, for all the higher senses have
warmth when 'aesthetic* objects excite them. And I reply in the
second place that even if secondarily aroused visceral thrills were the
only objects that had warmth, I should see no difficulty in accepting the
fact. This writer further lays great stress on the vital difference between
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the receptive and the reactive states of the mind, and considers that
the theory under discussion takes away all ground for the distinction.
His account of the inner contrast in question is excellent. He gives
the name of ' feeling-attitude ' to the whole class of reactions of the
self, of which the experiences which we call emotions are one species.
He sharply distinguishes feeling-attitude from mere pleasure and pain—
a distinction in which I fully agree. The line of direction in feeling-
attitude is from, the self outward, he says, while that of mere pleasure
and pain (and of perception and ideation) is from the object to the
self. It is impossible to feel pleasure or pain towards an object; and
common language makes a sharp distinction between being pained and
having bad feelings towards somebody in consequence. These atti-
tudes of feeling are almost indefinitely numerous; some of them must
always intervene between cognition and action, and when in them we
feel our whole Being moved (93-96). Of course one must admit that
any account of the physiology of emotion that should be inconsistent
with the possibility of this strong contrast within consciousness would
thereby stand condemned. But on what ground have we the right
to affirm that visceral and muscular sensibility cannot give the direc-
tion from the self outwards, if the higher senses (taken broadly, with
their ideational sequelae) give the direction from the object to the self ?
We do, it is true, but follow a natural analogy when we say (as Fouillde
keeps saying in his works on Idies-forces, and as Ladd would seem to
imply in his recent Psychology) that the former direction in conscious-
ness ought to be mediated by outgoing nerve-currents, and the latter
by currents passing in. But is not this analogy a mere superficial
fancy, which reflection shows to have no basis in any existing knowl-
edge of what such currents can or cannot bring to pass ? We surely
know too little of the psycho-physic relation to warrant us in insisting
that the similarity of direction of two physical currents makes it im-
possible that they should bring a certain inner contrast about.
Both Dr. Worcester and Mr, Irons insist on the fact that conscious-
ness of bodily disturbance, taken by itself, and apart from its combina-
tion with the consciousness of an exciting object, is not emotional at
all. " Laughing and sobbing, for instance," writes the former, " are
spasmodic movements of the muscles of respiration, not strikingly
different from hiccoughing t^and there seems no good reason why the
consciousness of the former two should usually be felt as strong emo-
tional excitement while the latter is not. . . . Shivering from cold, for
instance, is the same sort of a movement as may occur in violent
fright but it does not make us feel frightened. The laughter excited
in children and sensitive persons by tickling of the skin is not neces-
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sarily accompanied by any mirthful feelings. The act of vomiting may
be the accompaniment of the most extreme disgust, or it may occur
without a trace of such emotion " (289). The facts must be admitted;
but in none of these cases where an organic change gives rise to a mere
local bodily perception is the reproduction of an emotional diffusive
wave complete. Visceral factors, hard to localize, are left out; and
these seem to be the most essential ones of all. I have said that where
they also from any inward cause are added, we have the emotion ; and
ihat then the subject is seized with objectless or pathological dread,
grief, or rage, as the case may be. Mr. Irons refuses to accept this
interpretation. The bodily symptoms do not here, he says, when felt,
constitute the emotion. In the case of fear they constitute rather the
object of which we are afraid. We fear them, on account of their un-
known or indefinite evil consequences. In the case of morbid rage, he
suggests, the movements are probably not the expression of a genuine
inner rage, but only frantic attempts to relieve some inward pain, which
outwardly look like rage to the observer (80). These interpretations
are ingenious, and may be left to the reader's judgment. I confess
that they fail to convert me from my own hypothesis.*
Messrs. Irons and Wundt (and possibly Baldwin and Sully, neither
of whom accept the theory in dispute, but to whose works I have not
access where I write, so that I cannot verify my impression) think that
the theory carries with it implications of an objectionable sort philo-
sophically. Irons, for example, says that it belongs to a psychology in
which feeling can have no place, because it ignores the self and its
unity, etc. (92). In my own mind the theory has no philosophic im-
plications whatever of a general sort. It assumes (what probably every
one assumes) that there must be a process of some sort in the nerve-
* Mr. Irons elsewhere says that "an object on being presented suddenly may
cause intense fear. On being recognized as familiar the lerroc may vanish in-
stantly, and while the mental mood has changed, for a measurable time at least,
alt the bodily effects of' the former state are present" (86). Tbeir dying phase
certainly is present for a while ; but has the emotion then ' vanished instantly' ?
I should rather say that there is then a very mixed emotional state, in which some-
thing of the departing terror still blends with the incoming joy of relief. The case
of waking from nightmare is for us civilizees probably the most frequent experi-
ence in point. On such occasions the horror with me is largely composed of an
iatensely strong but indescribable feeling in say breast and in all my muscles,
especially those of the legs, which feel as if they were boiled into shreds or other-
wise inwardly decomposed. This feeling fades out slowly and until it Is gone the
horror abides, to spite of the fact that I am already enjoying the incomplete relief
which comes of knowing that the bad experience is a dream, and that the horror is
on the wane. It were much to be wished that many persons should make obser-
vations of this sort, for individual idiosyncrasy may be great.
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centres for emotion, and it simply defines that process to consist of
afferent currents. It does this on no general theoretic grounds, but
because of the introspective appearances exclusively.
The objective qualities with which perception acquaints us are con-
sidered by psychologists to be results of sensation. When these quali-
ties affect us with pleasure or displeasure, we say that the sensations
have a ' tone of feeling.' Whether this tone be due to a mere form of
the process in the nerve of sense, as some authors (e.g. Mr. Marshall)
think, or to additional specific nerves, as others (e.g. Dr. Nichols) opine,
is immaterial The pleasantness or unpleasantness, once there, seems
immediately to inhere in the sensible quality itself. They are beaten
up together in our consciousness. But in addition to this pleasantness
or painfulness of the. content, which in any case seems due to afferent
currents, we may also feel a general seizure of excitement, which
Wundt, Lehmann, and other German writers call an Affect, and which
is what I have all along meant by an emotion. Now whenever I my-
self have sought to discover the mind-stuff of which such seizures con-
sist, it has always seemed to me to be additional sensations often hard
to describe, but usually easy to identify, and localized in divers por-
tions of my organism. In addition to these sensations I can discern
nothing but t h e ' objective Content' (taking this broadly so as to include
judgments as well as elements judged), together with whatever agree-
ableness or disagreeableness the content may come tinged by.* Such
* The disagreeableness, etc., is a very mild affection, not drastic or grasping in le
in the case of any objective content except localized bodily pain, properly so called.
Here the feeling seems in itself overpowering in intensity apart from all secondary
emotional excitement. But I think that even here a distinction needs to be made
between the primary consciousness of the pain's intrinsic quality, and the con-
sciousness of its degree of intoUrability, which is a secondary affair, seeming con-
nected with reflex organic irradiations. 1 recently, while traversing a little surgical
experience, had occasion to verify once more the fact that it is not the mere Hgniss
of a pain that makes it most unbearable. If a pain is honest and definite and well
localized it may be very heavy and strong without taxing the extreme of our endur-
ance. But there are pains which we feel to be faint and small in their intrinsic
amount, but which have something so poisonous and non-natural about them that
consent to their continuance is impossible. Our whole being refuses to suffer them.
These pains produce Involuntary shrinkings, writhings, sickness, faintness, and
dread. For such emotion superadded to the pain itself there is no distinctive
name In English. Prof.Munsterberg has distinguished between Sckmert as an
original' content' of consciousness and Unlust as due to flexor reactions provoked
thereby; and before his Essay appeared, I remember hearing Dr. D. S. Miller and
Dr. Nichols maintain in conversation that painfulness may be always a matter of
' intolerabtlity,' due to the reflex irradiations which the painful object may arouse.
Thu« might even the mildest GtmattvorgBnge he brought under the terms of my
theory.
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organic sensations being also presumably due to incoming currents, the re-
sult is that the whole of my consciousness (whatever its inner contrasts
be) seems to me to be outwardly mediated by these. This is the length
and breadth of my 'theory'—which, as I apprehend it, is a very unpre-
tending thing.
It may be, after all, that the difference between the theory and the
views of its critics is insignificant. Wundt admits tertiary feelings, due
to organic disturbance, which must fuse with the primary and secondary
feelings before we can have an ' Affect;' Lehmann writes : " Con-
strained by the facts, we are obliged to concede to the organic sensa-
tions and tones of feeling connected with them on essential participa-
tion in emotion (wesentliche Bedeutung fur die Affecte ") (p. 115); and
Professor Ladd also admits that the' rank' quality of the emotions
comes from the organic repercussions which they involve. So far, then,
we are all agreed ; and it may be admitted, in Dr. Worcester's words,
that the theory under attack ' contains an important truth,' and even
that its authors have 'rendered a real service to psychology ' (p. 295).
Why, then, is there such strong opposition ? When the critics say that
the theory still contradicts their consciousness (Worcester, p. 288), do
they mean that introspection acquaints them with a part of the emo-
tional excitement which it is psycho-physically impossible that incom-
ing currents should cause ? Or, do they merely mean that the part which
introspection can localize in the body is so small that when abstracted
a laige mass of unrealizable emotion remains ? Although Mr. Irons
professes the former of these two meanings, the cmly prudent one to
stand by is surely the latter; and here, of course, every man will hold by
his own consciousness. I for one shall never deny that individuals may
greatly differ in their ability to localize the various elements 01 their
organic excitement when under emotion. I am even willing to admit
that* the primary GefUhlston may vary enormously in distinctness in
different men. But speaking for myself, I am compelled to say that the
only feelings which I cannot more or less well localize in my body
are very mild and, so to speak, platonic affairs. I allow them hypo-
thetically to exist, however, in the form of the ' subtler' emotions, and
in the mere intrinsic agreeableness and disagreeableness of particular
sensations, images, and thought-processes, where no obvious organic
excitement is aroused.*
*Mr. Irons contends that In admitting: 'subtler' forms of emotion, I throw
away my whole case (88,89); and Dr. Lehmann enters into an elaborate argument
to prove (as be alleges, against Lange and me) that primary feeling, as a possible
accompaniment of any sensation whatever, must be admitted to exist (§ § 157-164).
Such objections are a complete ignoratio elenc/ti, addressed to some Imaginary
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This being the case, it seems almost as if the question had become
a verbal one. For which sort of feeling is the word ' emotion' the
more proper name—for the organic feeling which gives the rank char.-
acter of commotion to the excitement, or for that more primary pleas-
ure or displeasure in the object, or in the thought of it, to which
commotion and excitement do not belong ? I myself took for granted
without discussion that the word ' emotion' meant the rank feeling of
excitement, and that the special emotions were names of special feel-
ings of excitement, and not of mild feelings that might remain when the
excitement was removed. It appears, however, that in this assumption
I reckoned without certain of my hosts.
Dr. Worcester's quarrel with me at the end of his article becomes
almost exclusively verbal. All pleasure and pain, he says, whether
primary and of the higher senses and intellectual products, or sec-
ondary and organic, should be called 'emotion' (296).* Pleasure or
pain revived in idea, as distinguished from vivid sensuous pleasure and
pain, he suggests to be what is meant by emotion 'in the sense in
which the word is commonly used' (297) ; and he gives an array of
cases in point:
" Suppose that I have taken a nauseous dose and made a wry face
over i t No one, I presume, would question that the disagreeableness
lay in the unpleasant taste, and not in the distortion of the • counte-
nance. Now suppose I have to repeat the dose, and my face takes on
a similar expression, at the anticipation, to that which it wore when I
took it originally. How does this come about ? If I can trust my own
consciousness, it is because the vivid reproduction, in memory, of the
unpleasant taste is itself unpleasant. . . . If this be the fact, what can
be more natural than that it should excite the same sort of associated
movements that were excited by the original sensation ? I cannot make
it seem any more credible that my repugnance to a repetition of the
dose is due to my involuntary movements than my discomfort in taking
it originally was due to the similar movements that occurred then.
• . . I hardly think that any one who will consult his own conscious-
ness will say that the reason he likes the taste of an orange is that it
makes him laugh or smile to get it. He likes it because it tastes good,
and is sorry to lose it for the same reason." (Ibid.)
theory with which my own, as I myself understand It, has nothing whatever to do,
all that I have ever maintained being the dependence on incoming currents of the
emotional seizure or Affect.
• ' Tho essence of emotion is pleasure and pain,' he adds. This is a hackneyed
psychological doctrine, but on any theory of the seat of emotion it seems to me one
of the moit artificial and scholastic of the untruths that disfigure our science.
One might as well say that the essence of prismatic color b pleasure and pain.
There are infinite shades and tones in the various emotional excitements, which are
as distinct as sensations of color are, and of which one is quite at a loss to predi-
cate either pleasant or painful quality.
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Now, accepting Dr. Worcester's description of the facts, I remark
immediately that the nauseousness and pleasantness are due to incoming
nerve-currents—at any rate in the cases which he selects—and the feeling
of the involuntary movements as well; so whatever name we give to the
phenomena, so far they fall comfortably under the terms of my theory.
The only question left over is what may be covered by the words
' repugnance' and ' liking,' which I have italicized, bat which Dr. Wor-
cester does not emphasize, as he describes his instances. Are these a
third sort of affection, not due to afferent currents, and interpolated
between the gustatory feelings and reactions which are so due ? Or are
they a name for what, when carefully considered, resolves itself into
more delicate.reactions still ? I privately incline to the latter view, but
the whole animus of my critic's article obliges me to attribute to him
the opinion, not only that the like and dislike must be a third sort of
affection not grounded on incoming currents, but that they form the
distinctive elements of the ' emotional' state of mind.
The whole discussion sharpens itself here to a point. We can
leave the lexicographers to decide which elements the word 'emo-
tional ' belongs to; for our concern is with the' facts, and the question
of fact is now very plain. Must we {under any name) admit as an
important element in the emotional state of mind something which is
distinct both from the intrinsic feeling-tone of the object and from
that of the reactions aroused—an element of which the ' liking' and
' repugnance' mentioned above would be types, but for which other
names may in other cases be found ? The belief that some such element
does exist, and exist in vital amount, is undoubtedly present in the
minds of all the jejectors of the theory in dispute. Dr. Worcester rightly
regrets the deadlock when one man's introspection thus contradicts
another's (288), and demands a more objective sort of umpire. Can
such a one be found ? I shall try to show now that it possibly has
been found; and that Dr. Sollier's recent observations on complete
anaesthetics show that in some persons at least the supposed third
kind of mental element may exist, if it exists at all, in altogether in'
appreciable amount.
In my original article I had invoked cases of generalized anes-
thesia, and admitted that if a patient could be found who, in spite of
being anaesthetic inside and out, could still suffer emotion, my case
would be upset I had quoted such cases as I was aware of at the
time of writing, admitting that so far as appearances went they made
against the theory; but I had tried to save the latter by distinguishing
between the objective reaction which the patient makes and the sub-
jective feeling which it gives him. Since then a number of cases of
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generalized anaesthesia have been published, but unfortunately the
patients have not been interrogated from the preper point of view.
The famous ' theory' has been unknown to the reporting doctors.
Two such caser, however, described by Dr. Berkley of Baltimore,* are
cited by Dr. Worcester ' for what they are worth' in its refutation
(294). The first patient was an Englishwoman, with complete loss
of the senses of pain, heat and cold, pressure and equilibrium, of smell,
taste, and sight The senses of touch and of position were not com-
pletely gone, but greatly impaired, and she could hear a little. As
for visceral sensations, she had had no hunger or thirst for two years,
but she was warned by feeling of the evacuative needs. She laughs at
a joke, shows definitely grief, shame, surprise, fear, and repulsion. Dr.
Berkley writes to Dr. Worcester as follows : " My own impression de-
rived from observation of the patient, is that all mental emotional
sensibilities are present, and only a little less vivid than in the unan-
sesthetic state ; and that emotions are approximately natural and not
at all coldly dispassionate."
The second case was that of a Russian woman with complete loss
of cutaneous, and almost complete loss of muscular, sensibility. Sight,
smell, hearing preserved, and nothing said of visceral sensation (in Dr.
Worcester's citation). She showed anger and amusement, and not the
slightest apathy.
This last case is obviously too incompletely reported to serve; and
in the preceding one it will be noticed that certain degrees of visceral
and of muscular sensibility remained. As these seem the important
sorts emotionally, she may well have felt emotion. Dr. Berkley, how-
ever, writes of her ' apathy*; and it will be noticed that he thinks her
emotions ' less vivid than in the unanaesthetic state.'
In Dr. Sollier's patient the anaesthesia was far more complete, and
the patient was examined for the express purpose of testing the de-
pendence of emotion on organic sensibility. Dr. Sollier, moreover,
experimented on two other subjects in whom the anaesthesia was arti-
ficially induced by hypnotic suggestion. The spontaneous case was a
man aged forty-four ; the hypnotic cases were females of hysteric con-
stitution.f In the man the anaesthetic condition extended so far
that at present every surface, cutaneous and mucous, seems absolutely
insensible. The muscular sense is wholly abolished; the feelings of
hunger and satiety do not exist; the needs of defecation and micturition
* Brain, Part IV, 1891.
f The paper, entitled ' Recherches sur les Rapports de la Sensibility «t de l'£mo-
don,' wiJl be found in the Stvue Phihtophigue for March of this year, vol. xxxvn.
p. 841.
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are unfelt; taste and smell are gone ; sight much enfeebled; hearing
alone is about normal. The cutaneous and tendinous reflexes are lack-
ing. The physiognomy has no expression; speech, is difficult; the
entire muscular apparatus is half paralyzed, so that locomotion is al-
most impossible.
" ' I kn&Wy this patient says,' that I have a heart, but I do not
feel it beat, except sometimes very faintly.' When an event hap-
pens which ought to affect it [the heart, as I understand the text], he
fails equally to. feel it. He does not feel himself breathe, or know
whether he makes a strong or a weak inspiration. * I do not feel my-
self alive,' he says. Early in his illness he several times thought him-
self dead. He does not know whether he is asleep or awake. '. . .
He often has no thoughts. When he does think of anything it is of
his home or of the war of 1870, in which he took part The people
whom he sees come and go about him are absolutely indifferent to
him. He does not notice what they do. ' They do not appear,' he
says, ' like natural men to me, but more like mechanisms.' Similar
perturbations of perception occur also in hearing. ' I do not hear in
the old way; it is as if it sounded in my ear, but did not enter into
my head. It does not stay there long.' His aprosexia is complete, and
he is incapable of interest in anything whatever. Nothing gives him
pleasure. 'I am insensible to everything; nothing interests^me. I
love nobody; neither do I dislike anybody.' He does not even know
whether it would give him pleasure to get well, and when I -tell him
that his cure is possible it awakens no reaction—not even one of sur-
prise or doubt. The only thing that seems to move him a little is the
visit of his wife. When she appears in the room ' it gives me & stroke
in the stomach,' he says; ' but as soon as she is there I wish her away
again.* He often has a fear that his daughter may be dead. If she
should die I believe I should not survive her, although if I never were
to see her again it would make no difference to me.' His visual
images are non-existent, and he has no representation of his wife when
she is gone. The weakness of the sensations remaining to him gives
him a sense of uncertainty about all things: ' I am never sure of any-
thing.' Nothing surprises or astonishes him. His state of apathy, of
indifference, of extreme emotionlessness, has developed slowly part
passu with the anaesthesia. His case realizes, therefore, as completely
as possible the experiment desiderated by W. James."
In the hypnotic experiments, Dr. Sollier provoked in his subjects
sometimes -visceral and sometimes peripheral anaesthesia, and some-
times both at once. He registered the organic reactions (by pneumo-
graph, etc.).as far as possible, and compared them with those produced
in the same subject when an emotion-exciting idea was suggested, first
in the anaesthetic, and then in the normal state. Finally, he ques-
tioned the subject on the impressions she had received. For the de-
tailed results the reader must consult the original paper. -1 will only
mention those which item most important, as follows:
DISCUSSION. 5 29
(1) Complete peripheral anaesthesia abolishes completely the power
of movement At the same time the limbs grow cold and sometimes
blue (247).
(2) When visceral anaesthesia is added, the patient says she feels as
if she no longer were alive (ttna).
(3) When totally anaesthetic she feels no normal emotion whatever
at the suggestion of hallucinations and delusions which have the power
of moving her strongly when the sensibility is restored. When the
anaesthesia is less complete she may say that she feels not the usual
emotion, but a certain stroke in the head or stomach at the reception
of the moving idea (250, 254).
(4) When the anaesthesia is solely peripheral, the emotion takes
place with almost normal strength.
(5) When it is solely visceral, the emotion is abolished almost as
much as when it is total, so that the emotion depends almost exclu-
sively on visceral sensations (258).
(6) There is sometimes a very slight motor reaction shown by the
pneumograph in visceral anaesthesia when an exciting idea is suggested
(Figs. 2/ 7 bis), but M. Sollier thinks (for reasons of a highly specula-
tive kind) that in complete intmotivity the visceral reactions them-
selves do not take place (265).
The reader sees that M. Sollier's experimental results go on the
whole farther than ' my theory' ever required. With the visceral
sensibility not only the ' coarser' but even the ' subtler' forms of emo-
tion depart. Some people must then be admitted to exist in whom the
amount of supposed feeling that is not due to incoming currents is a
negligible quantity. Of course we must bear in mind the fallibility
of experiments made by the method of ' suggestion.' We must more-
over remember that the male patient's inemotivity may have been a
co-ordinate result with the anaesthesia, of his neural lesions, and not
the anaesthesia's mere effect. But nevertheless, if many cases like
those of M. Sollier should be found by other observers, I think that
Prof. Lange's theory and mine ought no longer to be treated as a
heresy, but might become, the orthodox belief. That part, if there be
any, of emotional feeling which is not of afferent origin should be ad-
mitted to be insignificant, and the name ' emotion' should be suffered
to connote organic excitement as the distinctive feature of the state.
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